Venter, A.,
No End in Sight for Sudan Hostilities. A. Venter. - Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor, 2003. - SIRS Enduring Issues 2004. Article 64, Global Issues, 1522-3221; .
Articles Contained in SIRS Enduring Issues 2004. Originally Published: No End in Sight for Sudan Hostilities, July 2003; pp. 11-12.
"In Sudan, the Machakos peace accord, signed between the ruling National Islamic Front (NIF) and the mainly Christian and animist Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), is in trouble again. There had been a theoretical agreement to halt hostilities and hold a referendum on self-determination in the south, but now Khartoum says it will not allow secession, in part because some of the country's most valuable oil resources lie in the disputed territories." (JANE'S TERRORISM & SECURITY MONITOR) This article discusses Sudan's failing peace accord.
1522-3221;
National Islamic Front--Sudan
Sudan People's Liberation Army
Ethnic relations--Political aspects
Sudan--History--1983---Civil War
Sudan--Politics and government
AC1.S5
050
No End in Sight for Sudan Hostilities. A. Venter. - Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor, 2003. - SIRS Enduring Issues 2004. Article 64, Global Issues, 1522-3221; .
Articles Contained in SIRS Enduring Issues 2004. Originally Published: No End in Sight for Sudan Hostilities, July 2003; pp. 11-12.
"In Sudan, the Machakos peace accord, signed between the ruling National Islamic Front (NIF) and the mainly Christian and animist Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), is in trouble again. There had been a theoretical agreement to halt hostilities and hold a referendum on self-determination in the south, but now Khartoum says it will not allow secession, in part because some of the country's most valuable oil resources lie in the disputed territories." (JANE'S TERRORISM & SECURITY MONITOR) This article discusses Sudan's failing peace accord.
1522-3221;
National Islamic Front--Sudan
Sudan People's Liberation Army
Ethnic relations--Political aspects
Sudan--History--1983---Civil War
Sudan--Politics and government
AC1.S5
050